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I.  INTRODUCTION
An (unfortunate) stylized fact common to virtually all reforming ex-socialist economies (RESEs)
is the deep fiscal crisis in which they have found themselves after the onset of the liberalization
programs (Table  1).
Table  1. Selected Economies in Transition:  General Government Balance
(in percentage of GDP)  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993
(proj.)
Albania  -8.6  .15.4  -30.6  -22.6  -19.6
Bulgaria  ..  -8.5  -4.1  -5.0  -8.0
former  Czechoslovakia  I/  -2.4  0.1  -2.0  -3.6  -2.2
Hungary  -1.3  0.5  -2.5  -8.0  -7.6
Poland  -6.1  2.7  -3.7  -7.1  -2.8
Russian Republic 2/  .-3.1  -6.3  -19.9  -7.4  -8.4
Sources: Ministries of Finance; World Bank staff estimates.
1/ The figure for  1993 is the weighted average of projected  Czech and Slovak Fiscal
Deficits
2/  Figures prior to 1991 refer to the USSR
To a certain extent the emergence of a fiscal crisis should not be surprising, since almost all the
reforming economies have also experienced, at least during 1990-91, considerable output losses,
of a magnitude not previously seen in market economies.  Inasmuch as automatic stabilizers were
built into the structure of thf socialist public sector (at least on the revenue side), one should have
expected that the recession would be accompanied by a large swing in fiscal balances.  But, asFiscal Crisis in Central  Europe  2
several  authors have pointed out, there are more serious, structural  reasons  underiying  the crisis,
which require the policy-makers'  attention.'  At least four factors are commonly cited:
On the revcnue side, the traditional tax base of RESEs was the state-owned
enterprise (SQE) sector. The sector has bome the main brunt of the recession,
thus driving  down tax collection,  and is likely to further  lose relative importance
in the economy,  as privatization  advances  and industry is downsized.
In addition, the loss of the traditional  tax base cannot easily be compensated  for
by increasing  contributions  from other sectors,  since either these are traditionally
difficult to tax (some services, small businesses), or the administration is not
prepared to implement  the new tax laws that are approved  by the legislature.
On  the  expenditure side, despite the  relief provided by  the  sharp cuts  in
govermnent  subsidies,  the central  government  is likely  to be burdened  with many
of the social costs of adjustment,  which were previously  hidden within the SOE
system. These include, in addition  to unemployment  benefits which are likely to
be high for a number of years, the cost of supporting,  either through the pension
system or the social assist.ance  system,  the people displaced  from the work-force
by the transformation.
Finally, the  switch to  positive real interest rate policies, together with  the
emergence of large deficits and non-bank financing of the budget, has led to
increasing  debt-service  pressures.
These factors are present, to a certain extent, in all countries, and can therefore be used to
provide partial explanations  for the overall crisis.  In this paper we examine relevant data for
Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia,  and assess their congruence  with the theses enumerated
' See, for example, Tanzi (1991 and 1993).Fiscal Crisis in Central Europe  3
above. We also analyze  data on tax payments from the private sector in Poland,  providing  the
first comprehensive  evidence available  on the subject for any RESE.
The  main  thesis  of  this  paper  is  that  traditional explanations fail  to  overlook crucial
interconnections  between key components  of the deficit, particularly between the reduction in
expenditures  and the decrease in revenues. We therefni  try to provide a somewhat  different
perspective.  We argue  that the impact  on the fiscal buc  of the crisis of the SOEs performance
- which is stressed  by almost all the studies  of the fiscal aspects  of transition - has been largely
everestimated.  Indeed,  the net contribution  to the government  budget  from the,  enterprise  sector -
defined as profit taxes net o,f  cross-subsidization  - has increased  during the transition  in Polaned
and Czechoslovakia,  and has not changed substantially in Hungary.  We posit that this net
measure is the mreaningful  variable to consider  in order to assess the "fiscal performance"  of the
enterprise sector in a socialist economy. After reexamining  the data, we conclude  that - while
it is undoubtable  that the fiscal crisis in RESEs should  be considered  of a structural  nature - its
main cause lies with the explosion  of expenditures,  rather than in the crisis in revenues.  Within
our 3nalyticai framiework,  we can provide a consistent explanation of the outstanding  fiscal
performance  of Czechoslovakia  vis-a-vis  Poladlu  aa.d  Hungary. fln  particular,  the increase  of social
insurance  expenditure  - a typical  development  during transition  - has been  moderate  in the former
Czechoslovakia,  while it has been dramatic  in the other two reforming  economies.
The paper is organized  as follows. In the next section,  we briefly review the economic  mission
of the public  sector under socialist  and market economies,  and present a flow-chart  model  of the
resulting fiscal flows among main sectors of  society.  We also review traditional theories
regarding  fiscal crisis during transition. In the third section,  we present  evidence  - from Poland,
Hungary  and Czechoslovakia  - supporting  to a varying degree an explanation  of the fiscal crisis
consistent with the traditional theories (mainly revenue-based).  We also provide a different
perspective,  and reach quite a different conclusion - that the explanation  of the fiscal crisis is
mainly to be found so far on the expenditure  side. In section four we review  the reasons for theFiscal  Crisis its Central  Europe  4
increase in expenditures,  and review some ev;dence on behavior  of private sector taxpayers in
Poland.
II. ECONOMIC  MISSION OF THE STATE  AND
BUDGETARY  CONSEQUENCES  OF ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION.
Is there a structural  reason  why RESEs  are experiencing  severe  fiscal woes? This section  appeals
to fundamentals.  It briefly  reviews  the main differences  in the economic  mission  of the state-the
functions of public finance in market economies  and centrally planned economies. A simple
model of fiscal  flows among  the main institutional  sectors  - government,  enterprises  (both private
and public) and households - is provided, in order to  emphasize the different role of  the
government  budget. Finally, the section discusses  the likely impact on government  finance of
the transition to market.
Il.l.  Economic  Mission of the State in Market and Centrally  Planned Economies.
Comparing properties of  fiscal systems and policies in socialist and market economies is
particularly difficult - as always is the case in comparative economics  - due to  the radical
differences  in the philosophies  which underlie  these systems,  their respective  institutions  and the
prevailing  economic  behaviors.
The main traditional  missions of public finance in market economies  are generally  categorized
into (i) allocation,  (ii) distribution and (iii) stabilization. 2 The first involves the allocation of
resources between private and public goods, as well as the choice of the desired  mix of public
goods.  The second mission empowers  the public sector to seek a "fairer" income distribution
than would  result as the unrestrained  outcome  of market forces  --presumably  undesirable  because
2  The classical  source  on the matter is Musgrave  (1959). More  recent references,  focused  on modem theoretical
justifications  of the government  intervention,  are Stiglitz (1989) and BarT  (1992).  A detailed treatment  of these
issues  goes obviously far beyond the scope of this section,  which therefore draws on them very selectively.Fiscal Crisis in Central  Europe  5
heavily influenced  by the underlying initial allocation  of wealth and production factors among
the pc; ulation. Finally, the stabilization  mission  mandates  the governmnent  to attempt to help the
economy achieve a better performance  in terms of growth,  employment  and inflation.
The functions  of public  finance in planned  economies  are best seen  in the context of the two most
important  characteristics  of such economies  - thie  state  ownership  of the means  of production and
the centrally  planned determination  of prices. 3 Due to these factorn,  the state  mak'Fs  virhally all
the  decisions related to  resource allocation, p;oduction and even (with some limitatio!ns)
consumption. The engine of economic  activity  is the central  plan, which spells  out in detail the
physical quantities  of all the intermediate  and final goods to be produced in the economy. The
government  budget,  in this context, is relegated  to a minor role, that of financial  appendix  to the
plan.  It translates the physical quantities  and transactions  envisaged  by the plan into monetary
tlows, given the administratively  set prices.
The government  action in planned economies  is mainly aimed at achieving  growth and equity
objectives. The first objective  is targeted, among other ways, by pushing resources into basic
industry  and other  selected  sectors,  through  heavy inter-enterprise  cross  subsidization.  This cross-
subsidization  is a direct  consequence  of the lack of price sensitivity  to excess  demand  conditions.
Large losses can thus accumulate in enterprises  that are nevertheless  required to continue to
provide inputs in the productive  process. As we will see, this feature  provides a crucial  element
in determining  the shape of the transition.
As to the equity  objective, socialist  countries  provide (at least in theory) their citizens with free
or highly subsidized  housing,  transportation,  health care, education  and basic consumer  goods,
besides a generous  social security system. On the other hand, the monetary  wages that workers
receive  from government  and public  enterprises  are low  and with little  variance  across  sectors  and
3  This is, of course, a simplification.  The degree to which the private  sector has been given some role in production
and price determination  varies significantly  across socialist  economies  and across time. An early and classical
reference  on these issues is Musgrave  (1968), which also provides  a comprehensive  introduction  to fiscal systems  in
socialist economies.  A recent comprehensive  source is Komai (1992), while a more compact treatment  of all these
topics can be found in Chand and Lorie (1992).I
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occupations,  and any income from private  enterprise  is taxed at punitive  rates. Public enterprises
typically  provide their employees,  in addition  to the wage, with a range of subsidized  services,
including  housing, health care, consumer  goods (available  through enterprise-run  stores), social
security services and, sometime,  even leisure and cultural  -rvices.
In sum, the main differences  in the economic  functions  of general government in market and
planned economies are  as  follows.  The  allocation and  the  distribution functions are
disproportionately  prevailirng  in the latter, and dominate  the whole economy. The stabilization
objective,  which is a crucial element of government  budget decisions in market economies,  is
generally not pursued t!irough budgetary policies in socialist economies. Indeed, given the
government  control of production and consumption,  the administrative  determination  of prices
and the tight control of foreign  trade, the budget cannot be a tool of macroeconomic  policy in
a traditional  sense. On the other hand, the budget  in planned economies  plays a more important
role in intermediating  transactions among diffe-ent sector of society, and has a considerably
greater role in redirecting monetary  flows among enterprises.
11.2. Fiscal  Flows Among Sectors  in Market-Oriented  and Centrally  Planned Economies.
The normative  differences  between the two systems  translate into a fiscal "dual" - i.e the fiscal
relations  between sectors  of societv. The differences  in these relations  are key to explaining  the
magnitude  of the fiscal crisis in the period of transition.
Figures  2.1 and 2.2 give a summarized  diagrammatical  representation  of the fiscal flows between
the government and the other economic agents - enterprises (both private and public) and
households  - in, respectively,  socialist  and market economies.  The rest of the world and financial
intermediation  are left out of the picture for simplicity.Fiscal Crisis in Central  Europe  7
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The main  sources of guvermunent  revenues in planned economies are profit taxes from public
enterprises,  sales (turnover) tax and social security contributions. 4 In market economies,  sales
taxes and social security  contributions  are also significant,  whereas  profit taxes are considerably
less important  (in relative terms) and are replaced, as main source  of revenues,  by the personal
income tax.  Most of the tax flows are paid for or intermediated  by the SOE sector in socialist
economies,  if nothirg else because the size of the private sector - although  changing  across  time
and countries  - is rather small, never having accounted  for more than about 25 percent of GDP
(or even being very close to zero as in Czechoslovakia). 5
On  the  expenditure side, socialist economies devote a  disproportionate percentage of  the
government  budget to consumer and producer subsidies.  The latter ones, combined  with large
profit taxes, result in  a massive inter-enterprise  cross-subsidization  - mediated through the
On govemment  revenues  in socialist  economies,  see Tanzi (1991) and Gandhi  and  Mihaliek (1992).
See for example Komai (1992, Table 5.1).Fiscal Crisis in Central Europe  8
go-vernment  - which is  a  typical phenomenon of  planned economies. In  other words, the
government  draws resources from healthy enterprises,  through the profit tax, and redistributes
them to unprofitable enterprises, through producer subsidies.' On the other hand, in  market
economies  both profit tax and producer subsidies  are almrost  negligible  (in relative  terms). The
size of consumer  subsidies  in planned e'conomies  results irom the socialist  approach  to resource
allocation  and income  distribution. In fact, households  income comes  from a combination  of low
wages  (from both government  and public enterprises),  sizable  consumer  subsidies  and the in-kind
enterprise  compensation  which was described  above, in addition  to government  transfers.
The market-oriented  pattern of government  expenditure  is markedly different  Consumer  and
producer  subsidies  are generally  small. Households  receive  their income mainly  through  (higher)
wages and sizable government  transfers, which allow them to take care of their needs through
market purchases. The core of economic  activity  and resource  use is shifted  from the public side
of the economy to the private one.
The heavy dependence  of planned economies  on public enterprises for production and income
generation  has a number of crucial  implications  for the economic  transformation  process, some
of which not easy to recognize  and detect. The most obvious of these is the need for massive
privatization,  which has been the object of a number of studies. 7 Another implication  - more
relevant for our purposes - is discussed  by McKinnon (1991), Tanzi (1991) and Gandhi and
Mihaliek  (1992). The taxation system  in RESEs was essentially  implicit.  By far, the bulk of tax
revenues  was collected  from public enterprises,  through  turnover  tax, profits tax and payroll  tax.
Almost all the operations which originate them were clearly shown on the account(s)  that each
public enterprise had at the Central Bank. Tax payment could be as simple as the transfer of
funds from those accounts to the government  account. Enforcement,  for example, was not a
problem. Former socialist  economies therefore  did not need, and indeed did not have, anything
6  Of course, profitability  is determined  to a large extent artificially  through the administrfative  determination of
relative prices. See below  for more on this.
An overview  of the issues is provided  by Hemming  (1992). For country-specific  studies,  see for example  Lipton
and Sachs (1990) on Poland, and Charap  and Zemplinerova  (1993) on the Czech Republic.Fiscal  Crisis in Central Europe  9
like the complex  and highly  specialized  tax administration  that is common in niarket  economies.
However, once  rr.sst of  the  enterprises are  private and  those remained state-owned are
operationally independent  from the government,  tax collection will be a completely  different
matter and require a western type of tax administration.
These considerations  bring  us into the topic to be developed  in the remaining  part of this section,
i.e. the impact of economic  transformation  on the government  budget.
11.3. The Budgetary Consequences of Transition.
We start by analyzing  the budgetary implications  of transition on the revenue side.
Most observers  agree that a sizeable  decrease  of tax revenues is likely to accompany  economic
transformation  of socialist  countries. 8 This is iue to several  factors. One is mentioned  above, i.e.
the need of building - almost from scratch - an administration  able to cope with the complex  tax
collection  problems  which raise in a market economy.  New tax laws can - at least in principle  -
be designed and approved  in a relatively  short time, but achieving  the administrative  capability
of  successfully impiementing the  new legislation is bound to  require much longer. 9 The
identification  and proper taxation  of the private enterprises,  a category  of subjects  which  may  be
completely  new to the tax administration,  is goirv to be difficult,  and a key issue for the outcome
of the fiscal  transition. The dimensions  of the problem are amplified  by the very essential  feature
of the economic  transformation,  i.e. the shift of the core of production and income generation
from public to private enterprises.  In some near future, the tax administration  may find itself a
completely obsolete machine, unable to tax income and wealth where they are going to be
produced  and accumulated. This argument  is probably  quite correct, as we document  in the next
section.
See for example  Tanzi (1991 and 1993)  and Stiehler (1993).
9  As to new laws, in Poland, for example, the Enterprise  Income Tax (EIT) and the Personal Income Tax (PIT) were
introduced  in 1992,  while Value-Added  Tax (VAT) was introduced  in 1993.Fiscal Crisis in7  Central Europe  10
Another  important issue - stressed by 5imost all  studies of fiscal aspects of transition - is the
decline of profitability in the public enterprises sector during transition, and the corresponding
decline in  profit tax payments.'  A first  explanation of  the fall of profits  is provided by  the
recession that has accompanied the reform. An extens.ve literature has been produced on the latter
tupic.'  The factors commonly cited include the collapse of CMEA trade (see Rodnik, 1992) and
the credit squeeze (see Calvo and Coricelli,  1992). Other orommon  ex.planations of the fall of
SOEs profitability are (i) the increase of labor unit costs, (ii) the disappearance of windfall profits
due  to  hyperinflation  and  historical costs  accounting,  (iii)  higher costs  of  energy and  other
imported production  goods, (iv) the inability of management's  inability to  deal with the new
system and (v)  the management's  attempts to  "hide" profits.'2 More generally, there is a wide
consensus that - although some success cases do exist (see Pinto et al., 1992, on Polish SOEs) -
the  overall  performance  of  the  public  enterprise  sector  has  considerably  worsened  during
transition.
However,  in  a  socialist system,  the data on  SOEs profits  tell  only  one  side  of  the story  of
enterprises  performance.  The  SOEs  performance  - and  profitability  - is  in  fact  closely
interconnected with cross-subsidization, which needs to be given due consideration in the analysis.
Although the cut in subsidies during transition has been widely acknowledged in the literature,
its  consequences on  the SOEs profitability  - and, therefore,  profit tax payments - have been
surprisingly disregarded.
On  the expeliditure  side, the transition  to  market  brings  - as just  mentioned  - deep cuts  in
producer and consumer subsidies, as well as a dramatic surge in transfers to households.  The
subsidies cut is a crucial part of any liberalization package. However, it may not include some
goods - for example, some basic food items or specific intermediate goods - to help maintain the
:  See, one for all, Stiehler (1993).
For a brief re'ie'.  of the main issues. see Bnino (1992, section V).
On one or more of these issues, see for example Schaffer (1992), Estin  et al. (1992), Schwartz et al. (forthcorning)
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political  viability  of the reforms  or avoid the bankruptcy  of key enterprises.  The rapid expansion
of the social security system - in all its components:  unemployment  benefits, social insurance,
social assistance  - is also directly related to the economic  transformation  process. Three years
of reforms,  however, suggest  that earlier expectations  about the evolution  of social expenditures
failed to size appropriately  the magnitude of the problem.  In particular, as we will see, the
expected  surge in recession-related  benefits  has been more than  overwhelmed  by the use that has
been made of the pension  system as an absorber  of surplus  labor previously  hidden in the SOEs.
Finally, the switch to a market economy brings about increased  expenditure  related to the need
to make quasi-fiscal deficits previously hidden in the banking sector an explicit budget item.
This point has been stressed  by many, particularly  inasmuch  as it implies that, at the early stages
of the economic  transfornation, targeting the fiscal deficit may not be very meaningful (Bruno,
1992, and Tanzi, 1993;  see also Schwartz  et al., forthcoming).Fiscal  Crisis in Central  Europe  12
III. REVENUE-  VS. EXPENDITURE-BASED
EXPLANATION  OF THE FISCAL  CRISIS:
EVIDENCE FROM POLAND,  HUNGARY  AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA.
In the previous  section we discussed  the main forces that can be expected to play a role in the
evolution of the fiscal accounts in economies  in transition. In this section, we offer evidence
from Poland,  Hungary  and Czechoslovakia  which contrasts  two separate  approaches.  The first is
emphasized  by most of the existing literature,  and stresses the strong  decline in fiscal revenues
as the main culprit for the fiscal crisis. In a nutshell,  deep expenditure  cuts, particularly  on the
subsidy side, have been insufficient  to counteract the ruinous decline in income tax payments
from enterprises  (mainly SOEs).
In the second approach, we argue instead that the revenue crisis is largely overestimated. In
particular, the profit tax decline observed under the new system is ephemeral.  In a socialist
economy enterprises  profits are conceptually  different from those of enterprises operating in a
market economy. The performance  of socialist  enterprises is heavily affected by the centrally
planned determination  of relative producer  prices - i.e., cross-subsidization.  Accordingly,  gross
profits are a poor indication  of the SOEs' contribution  to the economy's  value added  and to fiscal
revenues.  A more meaningful measure is instead provided by profit taxes net of producer
subsidies. We provide evidence  consistent  with this approach,  and find that the net contribution
of the enterprise  sector to government  finances has - if anything  - increased  during transition,  in
all the countries  considered. This is the basis for what we call the expenditure-based  explanation
of the fiscal developments  in transition economies. In the remainder  of the discussion in this
section, we utilize different decompositions  of the change in the general government  deficit in
Poland, Hungary  and Czechoslovakia  between 1986-88  (or 1985-87 for Poland) and 1991-92.Fiscal Crisis in Central Europe  13
We chose the periods so that they would be as representative as possible, for each country, of the
fiscal performance under the two distinct regimes.' 3
111.1. The Traditional View of the Fiscal Crisis
Although the direct and indirect budgetary consequences of transition are numerous and complex,
the heart of the matter, according to the "traditional" view, seems to be as follows.  We take two
periods  (1985-87  or. 1986-88  and  1991-92)  that  can  be  representative  of  pre-  and  post-
transformation fiscal performance in central Europe (table 3.1).
Table 3.1 Poland, Hungary  and Czechoslovakia:  Evolution  of Deficit , 1986-1992.
(Percent of GDP)  Poland  Hungary  Czechoslovakia
1985-87  1991-92  |  Change  1986-88  1991-92  Change  1986-88  1991-92  Change
General  Govt Balance  -0.4  -5.4  -5.0  -2.2  -5.3  -3.0  -1.7  -2.8  -1.1
Revenues  48.2  41.3  -6.9  61.3  53.3  -8.0  64.6  52.8  -11.9
Profit taxes  11.1  5.8  -5.3  10.5  4.0  -6.5  18.6  12.7  -5.8
Tumover  Taxes I/  11.5  7.2  -3.3  17.3  13.4  -4.0  15.8  12.7  -3.1
Expenditures  48.5  46.6  -1.9  63.5  58.6  -5.0  66.4  55.6  -10.8
Transfers  to H'holds  9.9  19.7  9.9  13.7  24.4  10.7  11.8  16.3  4.4
Subsidies  16.2  5.0  -11.2  15.6  5.6  -9.9  26.3  7.9  -18.5
Interest  0.9  2.2  1.3  1.8  3.9  2.1  0.0  0.8  0.8
Capital Expenditures  5.3  3.0  -2.3  8.0  6.3  -1.7  2.0  4.9  2.9
Sources: Ministries  of Finance; World Bank staff estimates.
1/ In Hungary  it includes  VAT,
13  In Poland. for example. the data for 1989  and 1990 are highly  distorted by two phenomena  that make their
interpretation  hopeless: the hyperinflation  of 1989 and the subsequent  increase  in paper profits in enterprises  in
1990  (see Barbone, 1992 and Schaffer, 1992).  We also checked  the sensitivity  of the results with respect to the
period chosen,  and found that the broad picture is not altered by considering  different periods.F;iscal  Crisis in Central Europe  14
The general government  balance deteriorated considerably between these two periods in both
Poland and Hungary, and only modestly in Czechoslovakia.  This deterioration is the result of
parallel trends  in  both  revenues  and  expenditures.  During the  period  under  consideration,
government revenues in fact decreased considerably, by as much as 8-12 percent of GDP.  In
turn, the main cause of this drastic fall is tax revenues from public enterprises.  Tax collection
from both private enterprises and individuals increased, but far less than necessary to offset the
former impact.
On the expenditure side, the increase in transfers to households - by 5-11 percent of GDP - is
more  than offset  by  the  cut  subsidies - by  11-19 percent  of  GDP  -,  so that  overall  total
government expenditures decrease - by 4-11 percent of GDP.  However, overall the reduction
in government revenues was too large to be offset by the decrease in government expenditure,
particularly  in  Poland  and Hungary.  Hence the emergence  of the  fiscal crisis.  This  can be
considered the heart of the "traditicnal" approach to fiscal crisis during transition in Poland and
Hungary.
In Czechoslovakia, on the other hand, the decrease of government expenditure was larger than
in Poland and Huingary, and it almost matched the decrease of government revenues. This  is
mainly, due to the fact that transfers to households increased much less in Czechoslovakia. Such
transfers account for a large fraction of government spending in all these countries, and they
almost doubled in size - relatively to GDP - in Poland and Hungary, while they increased by less
than 40 percent in Czechoslovakia. We will return to this issue, which, as we argue, is the single
most important factor behind the fiscal crisis in transition economies.
111.2. A Revenue Crisis?
Ihe  data just  shown, however,  needs to be better interpreted.  As mentioned in the previous
section,  one  of  the most  important  features of  a  socialist economy  is  the centrally  planned
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do  not  have  conceptually  much  in  common  with  their  market  counterparts,  but  are  rather
determined, to a large extent, by the structure of relative prices, which is set administratively.
Implicitly, sectors - and therefore enterprises - are divided by the central planner between "bad"
and  "good" ones,  and relative prices are chosen  so as to  penalize the former and  artificially
promote the  financial  performance  of  the  latter.  The resulting  inflated profit  tax revenues
received from "good" enterprises are then used to "cover the losses" of the discriminated-against
enterprises, through cross-subsidization.  In a market economy -without any cross-subsidization -
gross profits are relatively smaller, but the need for compensatory subsidies for loss-makers is
correspondingly reduced.  These considerations suggest that any meaningful comparison across
time and economic regimes of the overall enterprise sector performance needs to focus on profits
and (producer) subsidies together, that is, on the overall net direct contribution to fiscal revenues.
Only  in  this  way  we  can adequately  capture  the  evolution  of  the budget-enterprises  fiscal
relations, at a time when the intermediation role of the state comes to an end.
The  traditional  view  of  the  fiscal  crisis  cannot  be  faulted  for  attributing  a  large  share  of
responsibility to the SOE performance. On the face of it, profit tax revenues collapsed in Poland
from 11 percent of GDP in 1986 to 4.5 percent in 1992, in Hungary from 11 percent of GDP to
2 percent, and in Czechoslovakia from 18 percent to 12 percent (figures are rounded to unity; see
Appendix Tables A.1, A.2 and A.3). 14
The point that is not adequately stressed in these figures, however, is that the fall in profitability
is in itself largely attributable to the fall in subsidies.  The reduction in subsidies in the three
countries  considered  has  indeed  been  dramatic  (see  Tables  A.  1-3  in  the  Appendix).  They
decreased in Poland from about 16 percent of GDP in 1986 to 3.6 percent of GDP in  1992, in
Hungary from 17 percent of GDP to 4 percent, and in the former Czechoslovakia from 25 percent
to 7 percent. Even more strikingly, virtually all the cuts took place in only three years in Poland
(1989-1991) and two in Czechoslovakia (1990-1991), showing the early determination of these
'4  Data on profit tax and tumover tax refer to, respectively,  Enterprise Income  Tax and VAT, for the countries/years
in which they have been replaced  by the latter. See Tables in the Appendix  for more detail.Fiscal Crisis in Central Europe  16
governments to get rid of the old economic system. The process in Hungary has been somewhat
more gradual, with the cuts evenly spread over 1987-1992. The distribution of the few remaining
subsidies  varies across  countries. They  are mainly  consumer  subsidies in  Poland  (including
subsidies on housing), and producer subsidies in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. A major category
of consumer subsidies in all three countries - almost entirely eliminated by the reforms - used to
be on food products.  Major categories within producer subsidies included subsidies on energy
and intermediate goods."
We thus we reclassify fiscal data as follows. We obtain "net profit taxes" by subtracting producer
subsidies from  profit  tax revenues. Analogously,  we obtain  net total  revenues and  net  total
expenditures - i.e., net of cross-subsidization.
111.3.  Fall in Revenues or Rise in Expenditures?
Table  3.2 presents  a decomposition of the change in  the general  government deficit between
1986-88 and 1991-92 in Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia.  The structure of the table is very
similar to Table 3.1, except that it includes data on profit taxes, revenues and expenditures net
of cross-subsidization.
The deterioration  in the general government balance  during the period is thus unchanged:  5
percentage points of GDP in Poland and 3 percentage points in Hungary.  This deterioration can
now however be evenly decomposed in both countries into a decrease in net revenues (which fall
between 0.4 and 3.1 percent of GDP in the three countries) and an increase in net expenditures
for Poland and Hungary (4.5 and 1.4 percent of GDP, respectively). The former Czechoslovakia,
on the other hand, sees also a decrease in net expenditures as well, resulting in a worsening of
the fiscal deficit of only one percentage point of GDP.
Is  It goes without  saying that the subsidies  shown in the fiscal budget are not the only ones in the economy.  "Cheap"
loans, specific  contracts between  enterprises  and the government  and some govemment  regulations  can all - under
certain circumstances  - be considered  implicit subsidies.  This is one of the arguments  used to criticize  the fiscal
deficit as a measure  of macroeconomic  efficiency  (Tanzi, 1993,  and Schwartz,  forthcoming)Fiscal  Crisis in Central Europe  17
Table 3.2
Poland, Hu~igary  and Czechoslovakia:
Evolution  of Deficit - An Altemative Decomposition,  1986-1992.
(percentage  of GDP, average  over specified  periods)
Poland  Hungary  Czechoslovakia
1985-87  1991-92  Change  1986-88  1991-92  Change  1986-88  1991-92  Change
General Government  -0.4  -5.5  -5.0  -2.2  -5.3  -3.0  -1.7  -2.8  -I.
Balance
Net Revenues  41.1  40.6  -0.5  51.6  50.0  -1.6  49.5  46.4  -3.
Net profit taxes  4.0  5.1  1.1  0.7  0.7  0.0  3.5  6.4  2.
Tumover  Taxes  11.5  8.2  -3.3  17.3  13.4  -4.0  15.8  12.7  -3.
Net Expenditures  41.5  45.9  4.5  53.8  55.2  1.4  51.3  49.2  -2.
Transfers  to H'holds  9.9  19,7  9.9  13.7  24.4  10.7  11.8  16.3  4.
Consumer Subsidies  9.1  2.9  -6.3  5.8  2.3  .3.5  4.1  0.0  -4.
Interest Payments  0.9  2.2  1.3  1.8  3.9  2.1  0.0  0.8  0.
Capital Expenditures  5.3  3.0  -2.3  8.0  6.3  -1.7  2.0  4.9  2.9
Sources: Ministries  of Finance;  Authors' estimates
The decline in net revenues common to the three countries, however, is due to altogether different
reasons than the ones seen in table 3.1.  The most important fact emphasized by table 3.2 is in
fact that the net contribution of the enterprise sector to the fiscal budget has increased during
transition, by 1.  I percent of GDP in Poland and by almost 3 percent in Czechoslovakia and has
not changed substantially in Hungary.  Despite the shrinkage in the tax base due to the recession,
therefore, the transition to the market economy appears to have benefitted general government
finances, at least in their direct relation with the enterprise sector.
The main factor underlying the decline in revenues, on the other hand,  was provided - in all
countries - by the relative decline of turnover taxes, which shrunk by 3-5 percent of GDP.  In
Poland, such decrease is partially due to the fact that the prices of the goods which account for
most of the tax revenue - spirits, petroleum product and tobacco - have not kept pace with theFiscal Crisis in Central Europe  18
inflation rate, particularly in  1989 and  1990.  Collectability issues also played a role, as delays
in the payment of the tax increased sharply in those same years." 6
T  he reclassification of the data in table 3.2 also evidences an increase (rather than a dramatic fall
as  seen  before)  in  expenditures  of  the  general  government  (again,  with  the  exception  of
C-echoslovakia).  Netting out the cross-subsidization effect relveals increased outlays from the
state, mostly on transfers to the population" 7. It is on this basis that we can thus conclude that
the fiscal crisis in central Europe is largely an expenditure, rather than a revenue phenomenon.
IV.  ELEMENTS OF THE FISCAL CRISIS
This section reviews developments in revenues and expenditures in the three countries as seen
under the interpretation provided in the preceding paragraphs.
WV.I.  Exploding Social Security Expenditures.
The  importance  of  social  security  spending  in  explaining  the  fiscal  performance  of
Czechoslovakia  vis-a-vis  Poland  and  Hungary  was  already  clear  within  what  we  called  a
"traditional"  approach  to  the  subject (see  previous  section).  It  is  even  more  so  from  our
alternative perspective. Indeed, the former Czechoslovakia strikes as the only country where net
government expenditure decreased during transition, rather than increasing. The main explanation
is provided -as data in Table 3.2 shows - by the uneven developments across countries in social
security  expenditures.  Social  security  outlays  provide  the  bulk  of  general  government
expenditures.  In  Poland  and  Hungary  they  accounted  in  1992  for  almost  half  of  total
^  See Bolko%kiak  (1993). In 1989.  for example.  collection orders ceased  to be applied to tax charges,  weakening  the
entbrcement  of tax collection.
17  In fact, one could define the "net contribution"  of the household  sector in fashion similar to that defined for the
SOF sector.  Although  there are some methodological  problems  (since the introduction  of the personal  income tax
makes  pre- and post-liberalization  comparisons  difficult), the data would  show an increase  in net payments  to the
household  sector  even when the effect of the reduction  of direct subsidies  to households  is taken into account.Fiscal Crisis in Central  Europe  19
expenditures, and for about 30  percent of  total ir  Czechoslovakia. As  a matter of fact,
expenditures on social security increased fiom  1986-88 to  1991-92 by about 80 percent in
Hungary  and 90 percent in Poland,  but by less than 40 percent in Czechoslovakia.  In 1986, the
share of GDP spent on social security in Czechoslovakia  was two points higher than in Poland
and only one percentage point lower than in Hungary.  The same figure in  1992 is four
percentage  points lower than in Poland and almost ten percentage  points  lower than in Hungary.
Table 4.1
Poland and Czechoslovakia:
Annual Increases  of Number of Pensioners,  1986-92.
(annual % increase)
1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992
Poland
Total  2.1  2.8  3.0  2.4  4.1  11.8  6.9
Non-farmers  (FUS)  1.6  1.8  2.0  1.6  2.3  9.9  5.7
Old age  0.8  1.2  1.3  0.9  3.9  17.9
Disability  2.4  2.5  2.6  2.3  1.6  6.0
Surviving  2.4  2.7  2.3  2.9  1.4  1.7
Farmers  (KRUS)  4.4  7.2  7.0  5.7  11.1  18.9  11.2
Czechoslovakia  1/
Total  ..  0.9  0.2  2.5  1.1  2.1  1.2
Old Age  ..  1.6  0.2  2.4  2.1  3.1  1.5
Disability  ..  0.7  0.6  0.6  1.5  2.6  2.2
Surviving  ..  0.4  0.3  0.3  0.6  0.7  0.0
Other  ..  -4.0  -1.7  24.1  -10.6  -7.4  -5.6
Source:  Biuletyn Statystyczny  and Rocznik Statystycz4iy,  several issues;
Statisticka  Rocenka 1989,  90 and 1992,  and Czech Republic  Bureau of Statistics.
1/ Data for 1992  refer to Czech pensioners  only. However,  they account for about three fourths of the
pensioners  of former Czechoslovakia.
To  some extent, the increase in  social security spending was a  necessary consequence of
transition.  However, the  data  for  Poland  and  Hungary - particularly if  compared to
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functions,  in order to absorb  some of the social distress  brought  by the transition. The main data
are summarized  in Tables 4.1 and 4.2.
In Poland, the total number of pensione:s increased by almost 25 percent between 1990-92,
whereas  annual growth rates had ranged  between 2 and 3 percent in previous  years. Even more
revealing are  some disaggregated data. For example, the number of  old age  non-farmers
pensioners  increased by 18 percent in 1991, after increasing  by average by only I percent per
year in the period 1986-1990.  Although  the misuse  of retirement  and disability  pensions  reached
its peak in the aftermath of the reforms (1990-91), it still continued to a significant extent in
1992.
These developments are  closely interconnected with  the  massive process of  labor  force
reallocation  and/or reduction that has taken place in Poland from 1989 to 1992. During these
four years, employment in state-owned enterprises decreased by as much as 40 percent, and
employment  in the public sector - SOEs  and general government  - by almost 30 percent.  Overall,
employment in  Poland fell  by  12 percent in the  period 1989-92.  In  response to  that,
unemployment  benefits - which did not exist in 1986 - increased  to almost 2 percent of GDP in
1992. However, given the size of the phenomenon,  the burden of absorbing the reduction in
employment  spilled over to the rest of the social security system.
This spill-over  was made possible  by a combination  of liberal legislation,  loose application  of the
existing  rules and collusion  between  firms and employees  at the expense  of social security  funds.
The main factors  - common  to other transition  economies  - include  generous  eligibility  conditions
for early retirement  and disability pensions,  and high replacement  ratios.  As argued by Maret
and Schwartz  (1992) - tY-.  social insurance  system  has ended up playing  a role that should have
been assigned  to social assistance  programs  and other proper safety net provisions.
The picture is rather different  in the former  Czechoslovakia.  Formal  employment  there decreased
by  about  12  percent during  1989-92, a  figure comparable to  Poland.  However, theFiscal  Crisis in Central  Europe  21
unemployment  rate remained  much smaller,  at 6.6 percent in 1991  and 5 percent  in 1992  (it was
13.6 percent in 1992 in Poland).  This would suggest that the pressure on the social securicy
system might also have been very high; nevertheless,  the outcome in terms of number of new
pensions was very different than the one just seen for Poland.  While the growth rate of
disability  pensions  - which had been stable in previous years - more than doubled in 1990 and
increased by another 60 percent in 1991, the overall numbers remained considerably  below
Poland and Hungary  - in the latter, for example, the annual growth rate of total non-farme-s
pensions  increased  in 1991, one year after the reform,  by more than 400 percent,  compared  with
the average  annual growth rate in 1986-90. On the whole, inflows into the pension  system  after
1990 diverged sr:,  little from the long-term trends that had prevailed  until then.
The different  outcome  is probably  explained  by differences  in the social security  legislation  across
the two countries, as well as the administrative  application of the existing rules. A detailed
analysis of such differences is outside the scope of this paper, although the relevance  of such
study is enhanced  by our results. We only note here that, more generally,  the political  and social
environmnent  in which the reforms took place was also completely  different in the two countries.
Table 4.2
Poland  and Czechoslovakia:
Real Average  Pension, 1986-92.
(Poland, 1986=100;  Czechoslov,akia,  1987=100)
1986  |  1987  1988  1989  1990  |  1991  |  1992
Poland 1/  95.8  100.0  101.4  105.6  92.3  103.1  94.4
Czechoslovakia  2/  ..  100.0  104.2  117.6  107.5  80.0  71.2
Source:  Biuletyn  Statystyczny  and Rocznik  Statystyczny,  several issues;
Statisticka  Rocenka  1989, 90 and 1992,  and Czech  R-public Bureau  of Statistics.
1/ Data refer to average across  all pensions  (old age, disability,  surviving).
2/ Czech  Republic  only (which, however,  accounted  for about three fourths of CSFR pensions).
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A  final  important remark.  The  moderate increase in  social  spending in  the  former
Czechoslovakia  seems to have been achieved  - to some extent - also through important  cuts in
pensioners' living standards. The average  old age real pension  decreased  by 25 percent in 1991,
and by a further 11 percent in 1992.  8  They have somewhat recovered more recently. On the
contrary, Polish pensioners  were shielded from inflation throughout the transition process: the
average  real pension in 1992  was rouighly  at 1986 levels. (table 4.2)
With respect to the increase in social security expenditure  in Hungary, the relevant issues are
similar  to Poland's. They include  a wide misuse  of disability  pensions  and sick-pay,  and growing
arrears  in contributions  from enterprises. However,  the unusual size of social security spending
in Hungary  vis-a-vis Poland and Czechoslovakia  is also due to the fact that, since 1990, health
care has been taken over by the newly created Social Insurance Fund.
Two final remarks on expenditures. Interest payments have not posed a fiscal problem so far,
with the exception  of Hungary  - where they doubled during transition, reaching  over 4 percent
of GDP in 1992.  In the future, however,  debt service mnight  become  more problematic  in Poland
as well, if present  fiscal trend continues.
Capital expenditure has unsurprisingly borne a  considerable part of  the  burden of  fiscal
adjustment' 9, and has been reduced  considerably  in real terms in all three countries. In H'ingary
and Czechosiovakia  the decline (about 20 percent) has been somewhat more moderate  that in
Poland (40 percent).  These developments  are a clearly undesired  by-product  of fiscal tightening
during transition. This problem - and some relevant  policy suggestions  addressed  mainly to the
international  lending community  - are discussed  in Tanzi (1993).
Is  Such data refer to the Czech Republic  only (which, however,  accounted  for about three fourths of CSFR
pensioners).
19  For Czechoslovakia,  we add "capital  transfers to enterprises"  to proper 'capital expenditure",  to obtain total
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IV.2.  Tax Revenues  from Private Enterprises:  Evidence  from Poland.
A valid concern expressed  regarding  the future evolution  of tax revenues  is that the combination
of (i) the rapidly increasing  share of GDP produced by the private sector and (ii) the severe
problems faced by the goverrunent  in order to properly tax it might lead to future problems.
Poland and Hungary  have  the most developed  private sectors  in Eastern  Europe. They  accounted,
respectively, for approximately 50  percent and  35 percent of  GDP in  1992. The former
Czechoslovakia  follows behind, with about 15 percent of its GDP being produced  by private
enterprises  in that year. 20 The history of the private sector is of course also quite different  across
countries,  but the numbter  and importance  of private enterprises  has been rapidly growing in all
the countries considered. This calls into question the problem of the proper taxation of the
private sector (see Tanzi, 1991, and McKinnon, 1991).
The extent of this problem (if any) has not yet, to our knowledge,  been sufficiently  documented.
We present here some data on tax compliance  by the private sector that are now available for
Poland (Table 4.3).2 They span 1991, 1992  and the first half of 1993,  and are disaggregated  by
sector.
The evidence is mixed. The share of total turnover  tax and profit tax payments  accounted  for by
the private sector is clearly lower than the corresponding  share  of total revenues - roughly  by a
half. This pattern  is consistent  in the whole period covered  by the data. In the first half of 1993,
private enterprises  - all sectors  - accounted  for about 30 percent of total revenues,  but only about
14 percent of profit tax payments  and 15 percent of turnover tax payments. In industry  - from
which originates most of the total turnover taxes and profit taxes paid in the economy  - private
20  World  Bank staff estimates.
21  Data refer to medium and large enterprises,  defined  as those with more than 50 employees  in industry  and
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enterprises accounted for about 17 percent of revenues, but less than 12 percent of turnover tax
payments and less than 8 percent of profit tax payments.
Table 4.3. Poland:  Medium and Large Private Enterprises.
Turnover  Tax and Income Tax Payments.
(private  sector shares of total)
1993  2/  1992  1991
% of total 1/  revenues  tax  pta  turnover  proit  reve ue  turnover  profit
I  tax  tax  tax  |tax  s  tax  tax
Total  30.5  14.9  13.9  28.1  13.1  13.3  27.4  10.2  13.3
Industry  17.5  11.6  7.7  14.9  9.5  7.1  10.6  5.8  7.1
Construction  57.6  71.9  52.0  49.3  59.0  46.2  26.4  38.3  46.2
Agriculture  17.3  19.5  19.2  43.2  53.8  14.9  54.3  15.1  14.9
Transportation  14.7  42.9  15.0  14.8  42.2  11.3  8.0  30.0  11.3
Communic.  2.2  6.7  0.3  1.9  7.1  0.4  1.1  28.6  0.4
Trade  53.6  63.1  34.7  48.3  61.9  29.0  56.8  45.0  29.0
Source:  GUS (1992, 1993a  and 1993b).  See references.
Medium  and large enterprises  are those with more than 50 employees  in industry  and construction,  and more than 20
employees  in other sectors.
1/ The total refers to all medium  and large enterprises.
2/ First and second  quarter only.
Hlowever, at least with regard to turnover tax, the tax compliance of private enterprises - in all
sectors - appears to be improving. In fact, their share in turnover tax payments increased by about
50 percent from  1991 to  1993, while the share of revenues increased by only about 10 percent.
On the contrary, the profit tax compliance has worsened. For example, in the industry sector -
which accounted for about 60 percent of total profit tax in  1993 - private enterprises'  share of
revenues has increased since 1991 by about 70 percent, while its share of profit tax payments by
only about 10 percent. 22 As it does not seem logical to assume that private enterprises would be
22  The explanation  for such performance  is suggested  by some other data available  from the same source. In fact, the
data on costs and profits reported  there would imply a markedly  higher  profitability  in the public sector than in the
private one. The profits reported by medium  ard large private enterprises  are only 16 percent of total profits within
the category, while their sales are 28  percent of the total. Also, in 1992,  more private businesses  reported losses,  in
both absolute  and relative terms, than public  ones. Even allowing for a good performance  of a few public managers,Fiscal  Crisis in Central Europe  25
less profitable  than SOEs, this pattern seems  to point to a better  ability of private entrepreneurs
to hide their profits through  creative accounting  (evasion  on turnover  tax is in fact more  difficult
to accomplish).
V.  CONCLUSIONS
The main message of this paper, namely that the fiscal crisis in central Europe was mainly
attributable--in  the early 1990s--to  increasing  social expenditures,  rather than to the collapse in
enterprise  protitability,  is not intended  to minimize  the importance  of the continued  reform  of the
tax system and of tax administration. In fact, the data on private sector participation  in taxation
in Poland that we show suggest that that sector is likely to be a less willing complier with the
requirements  of the fiscal system.  To the extent that privatization  advances, maintaining an
adequate buoyancy for the tax system might become more problematic, unless tax reform
continues  with vigor.
The paper, however,  also sends  a cautionary  message  regarding  the possibility  of financing  further
increases  in expenditures. On a net basis, the decrease in revenues  that has accompanied  the
economic  transformation  is limited. All three countries  examnined  in this paper appear  to already
have levels of taxation that are higher than comparators  at similar per-capita  income levels, and
approximate  or surpass  those of western  Europe. While  no iron law exists  here, society at large
may not be willing to provide the resources that would be required to support  the current level
of expenditures  or to extend it even further.
these data overall simply suggest  a widespread  phenomenon  of profits hiding and, in general, tax cheating in the
private sector.Fiscal Crisis in Central Europe  26
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Table A.1
Poland:  Operations  of the General Government,  1986-92.
(in percentage  of GDP)
1986 F  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992
Total  Revenues  49.4  46.9  48.0  33.8  43.0  39.8  42.8
Tax Revenues  47.0  44.6  46.3  30.3  37.8  34.7  38.0
Turnover  Tax  11.6  10.6  10.8  7.2  6.3  7.4  9.1
Enterprise  Income Tax  1/  11.0  11.4  12.7  7.9  14.0  7.2  4.5
Individual Income Tax 1/  3.8  3.6  3.5  2.8  3.0  2.0  7.1
Taxes on Foreign Trade  2.8  2.4  2.0  0.9  0.6  2.0  2.2
Payroll Tax  9.5  12.7  12.4  8.7  9.6  9.0  10.8
Other  8.2  3.8  4.9  3.7  4.2  7.0  4.5
(memo: priv.  tax contr.)  2.0  2.2  2.e  2.1  2.7  2.9  3.5
Nontax Revenues  2.4  2.3  1.6  3.5  5 1  5.1  4.2
Total Expenditures  49.7  47.7  48.0  39.9  39.8  43.5  49.8
Current Expenditure  43.8  43.3  43.9  37.2  37.1  40.3  47.0
Wages (net)  1.3  1.5  1.5  2.0  3.3  5.2  7.6
Goods and Services  3.8  3.6  3.3  2.0  3.6  7.6  6.1
Subsidies  16.3  15.9  16.0  11.6  7.8  3.5  3.6
Consumer Subsidies  9.1  10.0  10.0  6.9  3.9  2.6  3.1
o/w Food  3.1  3.4  4.9  3.0  0.2  0.0  0.0
Housing  3.1  3.6  2.5  2.0  2.8  2.2  2.6
Producer  Subsidies  7.1  5.9  6.0  4.7  3.9  0.9  0.5
T'ransfers to Households  9.7  9.4  9.5  9.2  11.2  17.8  21.6
Social Insurance  9.0  9.2  9.2  9.1  10.4  15.8  19.0
Labor Fund  0.5  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.6  1.6  2.1
Social Assistance  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.2  0.4  0.5
Interest  1.4  1.2  1.0  3.0  1.8  1.4  3.0
Other  11.4  11.8  12.7  9.4  9.4  4.8  5.2
Capital Expenditure  5.9  4.4  4.2  2.7  2.8  3.2  2.8
Surplus/Deficit  (-)  -0.3  -0.8  0.0  -6.0  3.1  -3.7  -7.1
Source:  Ministry of Finance; Authors'  estimates.
I1/  Before  1992, data refer to - respectively - Profits Tax (Income Tax) and Wage Tax.Fiscal Crisis in Central Europe  30
Table A.2
Hungary: Operations of the General Government, 1986-92.
(in percentage of GDP)
1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992
Revenues  61.5  59.1  63.4  58.9  57.4  54.5  52.1
Tax Revenues  52.2  52.4  54.0  48.3  47.5  43.7  41.2
Ent. Income  Tax  11.1  11.9  8.4  6.9  7.3  5.6  2.4
Ind. Income  Tax  0.8  0.8  4.7  5.4  6.5  7.8  7.8
Turnover Tax 1/  15.0  15.3  21.7  17.1  16.5  13.5  13.2
Taxes on Foreign Trade  3.5  2.8  3.0  4.0  3.1  2.7  2.8
Payroll Tax  16.6  15.8  14.8  14.1  13.7  13  12.5
Other  5.2  5.8  1.4  0.7  0.4  1.1  2.5
Nontax Revenues  9.3  6.7  9.4  10.6  10.0  10.8  10.9
Expenditures  64.6  62.7  63.4  60.2  57.2  57  60.1
Current  Expenditure  56.6  54.6  55.6  53.7  52.5  50.9  53.7
Wages  8.1  7.6  8.7  8.2  7.6  8.9  9.6
Goods  & Services  11.4  12.0  12.8  12.1  11.2  9.1  9.5
Subsidies  16.6  16.2  14.0  12.5  9.6  7.1  4.2
Consumer Subsidies  6.3  6.2  5.0  6.6  5.5  3.7  1.0
Producer Subsidies  10.3  10.0  9.0  5.9  4.2  3.4  3.2
Transfers  to Households  13.1  12.6  15.3  18.6  20.9  22.6  26.1
Interest  Payments  1.3  2.6  1.6  2.4  3.2  3.4  4.4
Other  6.2  3.6  3.3  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.0
Capital  Expenditure  8.0  8.1  7.7  6.5  4.6  6.1  6.4
Surplus/Deficit (-)  -3.1  -3.6  0.0  -1.3  0.4  -2.5  -8
Sources: Ministry  of Finance; World Bank staff estimates.
I/  It includes,  from 1989 on, VAT.Fiscal Crisis in Central Europe  31
Table A.3
Czechoslovakia: Operations of the General Government, 1986-92.
(in percentage of GDP)
1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992
Revenues  63.1  65.2  65.6  69.5  61.2  52.8  52.7
Enterprise Income  Tax  18.2  19.2  18.2  11.0  12.2  13.7  11.7
Individual  Income  Tax  6.9  7.0  6.9  6.9  6.7  6.1  7.7
Turnover Tax  15.9  15.6  15.8  17.7  18.0  12.6  12.8
Payroll  Tax  5.9  6.3  6.6  15.0  14.4  11.0  10.3
Taxes on Foreign Trade  0.7  1.4  2.1  1.9  3.2  1.2  1.7
Other 1/  15.5  15.7  15.9  17.0  6.6  8.1  8.5
Expenditures  65.9  66.1  67.1  72.2  61.6  54.8  56.3
Current Expenditure  63.9  64.1  65.1  70.6  59.5  50.6  50.8
Wages  7.4  7.5  7.5  9.0  8.5  9.3  6.6
Goods & Services  15.8  16.5  17.1  16.2  16.1  15.1  19.7
Interest Payments  - - - 0.0  0.2  0.5  1.1
Transfers to Households  11.9  11.8  11.7  13.6  13.6  16.1  16.4
Social  Insurance  ..  ..  ..  ..  11.7  12.1  13.4
Unemployment  Benefits  - - - - - 0.6  1.1
Social  Assistance  ..  ..  ..  ..  1.6  3.3  2.1
Subsidies  25.4  25.5  28.0  31.1  21.0  9.0  6.7
Current Transfers to Ent.  18.2  18.4  21  25  16.2  7.7  5
o/w Producer Subsidies  4.1  4.2  4.0  6.5  4.2
Capital Transfers  to Ent.  7.2  7.1  7.0  6.1  4.8  1.3  1.7
Other  3.4  2.8  0.8  0.7  0.1  0.6  0.3
Capital  expenditure  2.0  2.0  2.0  1.6  2.1  4.2  5.5
Surplus/Deficit  (-)  -2.8  -0.9  -1.5  -2.7  -0.4  -2.0  -3.6
Stock adjustments 2/  - -2.1  -1  -6.6
Surplus/Deficit  (-)  -2.8  -0.9  -3.6  -3.7  -7.0  -2.0  -3.6
Sources: Ministry  of Finance; IMF and World Bank  staff estimates.
Note:  Data before 1989  were not collected  according  to IMF Government  Finance  Statistics  standards.
Data include Subsidized  Organizations  and Funds of Ministries.
1/  It includes Funds of Ministries  revenues, which averaged 45 billions  of koruny in 1986-88.  In 1989, it
includes  other taxes on profits, which accounted  for 7% of GDP.
2/  Includes  transfers to cover debts of retail  trade organizations  (1988)  and transfers to banks and foreign  trade
organizations  to cover devaluation  losses  (1989-90).Fiscal Crisis in Central  Europe  32
Table  AA4
Poland: Financil  Position of Enterprise,  1986-92.
(in tililons of Zlotys)
1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992
Revenues  21938.7  28863.8  48540.9  153767.5  805396.6  1479957  1845404
Costs  19024.7  24454.7  40626.7  114967.3  629312.9  1390594  1786724
Gross Profits  2919.9  4439.5  8250.1  53418.1  188446.5  67439  38552
Gross Prof./Rev.  13.3  15.4  17.0  34.7  23.4  4.6  2.1
Source: Rocznik  Statystyczny  and Biuletyn Statystyczny,  several years.Fiscal Crisis in Central  Europe  33
Table A.5
Hungary: Flnancial Position of Enterprises,  1986-92.
(in bilions of forint)
1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992 1/
GDP  1088  1226  1435  1710  2079  2308  2782
rG,ross  Labor Income  515.4  561.2  676.4  771.7  971.1  1207.3  1447.3
Tot.Gross  Profits 2/  374  438  371  454  462  287  213
Prof1ts/GDP  34.4  35.7  25.9  26.5  22.2  12.4  7.7
Source: Hungarian authorities;  International  Monetary  Fund.
1/  Subject to revision.
2/  Before direct taxes and before  subtracting  depreciation.I
Fiscal Crisis in Central Europe  34
Table A.6
Czechoslovakia: Financial Position of Enterprises,  1986-92.
(in billions of koruny)
1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1/
Output  1552  1595  1627  1650  1705  1998  1319
Costs  1414  1452  1477  1539  1615  1879  1262.8
o/w Wage Costs  218  223  228  226  226  222  154.5
Wage Tax  40  44  49  108  i 12  108  74.5
Tot.Gross Profits  2/  178  184  191  158  170  153  77
Gross Profits/Output  11.5  11.5  11.7  9.6  10.0  7.7  5.8
Czech Enterprises
Gross Profits/Output  ..  ..  ..  10.7  10.7  9.2  7.9
Slovak Enterprises
SR Ent. Prof./Out.  ..  ..  ..  ..  7.8  3.8  0.4
Source: Czechoslovak  authorities;  International  Monetary  Fund.
1/  First three quarters only. Subject  to revision.
2/  It includes  extraordinary  receipts.Policy  Research Working  Paper  Series
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